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1. Introduction  
 
 
“In the days leading up to September 30, the federal government is 
Cinderella, courted by legions of individuals and organizations eager 
to get grants and contracts from the unexpended funds still at the 
disposal of each agency.  At midnight on September 30, the 
government’s coach turns into a pumpkin.  That is the moment – the 
end of the fiscal year—at which every agency, with few exceptions, 
must return all unexpended funds to the Treasury Department.”  In 
Bureaucracy, by James Wilson. Basic Books, 1989, p.116) 
 
 
It is a characteristic of many government bureaucracies to operate under a mostly 
fixed budget that has to be returned if unspent.  At the beginning of the fiscal year, a 
typical agency receives a budget that allows it to operate during the next twelve 
months.  If the budget is not spent by the end of the fiscal year, it has to be returned to 
the funding organization.  For instance, many state universities and government 
agencies operate this way.  They receive a fixed budget from the legislature and, if at 
the end of the fiscal year some of the budget goes unspent, it has to be returned to the 
legislature.  While unanticipated expenses may be accommodated in exceptional 
cases, such options are usually severely limited and quite an uncertain prospect for the 
agency. 
In this paper, we consider a bureaucratic agency that operates under a fixed 
budget and must return any unspent portion of this budget to the funding authority at 
the end of the fiscal year.  Two questions arise from such an arrangement.  First, why 
does the funding authority operate in this manner, and second, what are the incentive 
effects on the bureaucratic agency?  Indeed, as noted by Wilson (1989), such 
“agencies do not have a material incentive to economize: Why scrimp and save if you 
cannot keep the result of your frugality?”  In this paper we focus on the second 
question, the incentive effects, but we begin by addressing the first question. 
There is a large literature in political science that argues why funding 
authorities may have little control over a bureaucratic agency other than being able to 
fix its budget.
1  Brehm and Gates (1997) note that civil servants enjoy considerable 
                                                 
1 Niskanen’s notion of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat, who can choose a budget, has been widely 
challenged in the political science literature.  Aberbach et al (1981) state that agency chiefs may argue 
for increments in their budgets but have little control over their budgets, and Moe (1997) cites authors 
who question the budget-maximizing assumption.  
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protection from political influence, and they cite several commentators who have 
advocated for such protection.  Besides Max Weber’s (1947) well-known fear of 
“dilettantism” by politicians, Woodrow Wilson (1887) also argued that a bureaucracy 
should remain “outside the sphere of politics”, to shield bureaucrats from the narrow 
interests of politicians.   
Even if one questions whether bureaucrats should be shielded from the 
influence of politicians, as a practical matter, political bodies have little knowledge in 
delivering public service.  While Congress may want to provide an education-friendly 
budget by providing an increase in the allocation to education, they have to leave the 
details of implementation to the Department of Education run primarily by career 
bureaucrats.  Congress may well state general goals but, as Wilson (1989) explains, 
bureaucracies are best defined by “tasks”.  Promoting the “long-range security 
interests of the United States” may be the stated goal of the State Department, but it is 
bureaucrats who must develop guidelines and implement actions to achieve such a 
goal.  The Congress has limited ability to condition the budget on specific 
performance measures. 
In the economics literature, Tirole (1994) also recognizes the difficulty of 
measuring the performance of agencies characterized by such general goals.
2  Tirole 
also highlights the lack of commitment abilities of political authorities.  Not only the 
tastes of political authorities are fairly diverse but they change over time “in a non-
contractible manner.”  This lack of time consistency prevents political authorities 
from committing to an incentive scheme. 
Whether by design (to prevent undue political influence) or by necessity (due 
to lack of measurement capacity or commitment ability), the budget can be seen, to a 
large extent, as depending very little on the agencies’ actual performance.
3   
This view of bureaucracy begs our second question: how to provide incentives 
to bureaucrats?  The literature has identified two models of organizational design for 
bureaucracies (see e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1986)).  At one extreme, the bureaucracies 
                                                 
2  To quote Tirole: “…..even an econometrician may have a hard time measuring the regulator’s 
contribution to the net consumer surplus.  And who will put reliable numbers on the US Department of 
States performance in ‘promoting the long range security and well being of the United States, and on 
the US Department of Labor’s success in ‘fostering, promoting, and developing the welfare and the 
wage earners of the US’?” 
3 Moreover, as noted by Johnson and Libecap (1989), at the individual level, a bureaucrat is difficult to 
fire and a bureaucrat’s salary is not tied to the agency’s budget.  
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rely on the bureaucrat’s professionalism to resolve any incentive problems.   
Bureaucrats are professionals.  Professionals are trained in “professions which 
emphasize not only technical competence but also conscientious devotion to duty.”  
(Rose-Ackerman (1986))  They receive most of their incentives from outside the 
bureaucracy, mainly from organized groups of fellow practitioners and the self-
satisfaction of doing their duty well.
4  At the other extreme, the organizational design 
relies on clear rules and standards with rewards and penalties directly tied to specific 
achievements of the individual.  Notably such more formal incentive systems are 
intended for low-level bureaucrats (called ‘street-level bureaucrats’ by Lipsky (1980)) 
while the upper-levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy relies on professionalism. 
We draw on both types of organizational design in this paper.  We present a 
model of a bureaucracy with three layers: a funding authority, an upper-level manager 
and an agent.  The first layer is the funding authority, which may represent the 
Congress for instance.  It has no informational capability, or ability, or time to run the 
many agencies it funds.  In the language of Aghion and Tirole (1997), the funding 
agency has formal authority but it must relinquish real authority to an upper-level 
manager – whom we call the bureaucrat – who runs the agency.  This bureaucrat 
herself hires an agent who produces the output.  Next we explain that we model the 
bureaucrat as a professional and the agent as a street-level bureaucrat or procurement 
firm. 
The bureaucrat is a professional who shares, for the most part, the goals of the 
funding agency, and works without a formal incentive scheme.  We recognize that 
professionalism may sometimes fall short.  In the most well-known variation of 
Niskanen (1971), Migué and Bélanger (1975) assume that the bureaucrat cares about 
his discretionary budget.  The discretionary budget is the difference between the 
budget and the cost required to produce the output.   
While bureaucrats are supposed to return this difference to the funding 
authority, it is well-known that, when facing an unspent budget, bureaucrats often go 
                                                 
4 Brehm and Gates (1997) discussing the role of  professional standards norms and self-selection that 
plays an important role write in the preface to their book, “the police officer, the social worker, the 
NASA engineer, the health inspector chose their jobs not for the possibility of maximizing leisure, or 
even for the material rewards of the job, but for the intrinsic character of the job itself.”, and elsewhere, 
“Our book offers one answer: bureaucratic accountability depends most of all on the preferences of 
individual bureaucrats.  Fortunately for us, those preferences are overwhelmingly consistent with the 
jobs the American democracy sets for them to do.”  
  4
on a “spending spree.”  For instance, the end of the fiscal year often witnesses the 
purchase of new equipment and travel to exotic places for conferences.  In the U.S., 
July marks the start of the last quarter of the fiscal year and this period is known 
among federal contractors as “Christmas in July.”
5  In 2005, an audit by the U.S. 
Department of Defense Inspector General denounced the approval of hundreds of 
millions of dollars on questionable "last-minute" projects.
6   The audit revealed that 
74 out of 75 selected purchases scheduled at the end of fiscal 2004 “were either 
hastily planned or improperly funded.”  It also found the department of Defense 
“parked” $2 billion that were unspent at the end of 2004 in a special account intended 
for information technology purchases, apparently to keep it out of sight of Congress 
and so it could be spent later. "They know the money is lost to them if they don't use 
it," says Eugene Waszily, assistant inspector general at the General Services 
Administration
7 .  While accounting controls should prevent some unnecessary 
expenses, we will recognize in our model that the unspent budget can be 
“appropriated” by the bureaucrat and become a discretionary budget.  
The discretionary budget allows the bureaucrat to pursue goals different from 
those of the funding authority.  This is known as “policy drift” (Libecap (1986)) and 
is distinct from standard shirking.  The discretionary budget, also known as “slack,” is 
sometimes seen as the “bureaucratic equivalent of personal income” (Moe 1997).  We 
capture this policy drift by including the discretionary budget in the bureaucrat’s 
objective function.  
The agent can either be a procurement firm or a street-level bureaucrat.  The 
procurement firm has private information about its production cost and must be given 
an incentive scheme to limit its information rent.  The procurement problem has 
received much attention in economics (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)).  Our 
contribution is to analyze a procurement contract offered by a bureaucrat operating 
under a fixed budget with a policy drift.  
The agent could also be seen as a street-level bureaucrat, who is not a 
professional and requires a formal incentive scheme.  Street-level bureaucrats may 
have conflicting preferences with the upper management (our bureaucrat).  For 
                                                 
5 Wall Street Journal editorial, “Christmas in July,” July 19, 2006. 
6 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (2005), 
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/FY05/05-096.pdf 
7 Wall Street Journal editorial, “Christmas in July,” July 19, 2006  
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example, Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) present a detailed empirical study of the 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982.  They find that case workers (street 
level bureaucrats) in JTPA training centers were motivated to help the less 
employable participants even though it decreased the performance measure of the 
training center and the middle manager (bureaucrat).  As Dixit (2002) notes, perhaps 
the bureaucrat “should have devised an incentive scheme to induce truthful revelation 
of information by the case workers.” 
8 
Agency models have been used to analyze bureaucracies, but key elements of 
the environment have not received much attention.  In this paper, we open up the 
modeling of the production process.  A bureaucrat, armed with a fixed budget and 
influenced by a policy drift, contracts with another agent (public servant or private) to 
produce output.  This allows us to look at the impact of the budget rules on incentives 
in bureaucracies.  The funding authority needs to understand how the bureaucrat will 
distort the contract offered to the agent.   
One expected result is that the bureaucrat will want to overproduce, but, in 
addition, we show that a fixed budget can have a dramatic effect on the structure of 
incentive contracts. More specifically, we show that underfunded bureaucracies will 
optimally lower the power of incentives.  Furthermore, the more professional the 
bureaucrat (i.e., a bureaucrat who less cares about policy drift), the weaker the power 
of incentives.  We also show that the bureaucrat even offers in equilibrium a pooling 
contract that nullifies the power of incentives if she is more professional and/or if the 
budget is tighter.  Despite lowering the power of incentives, our results suggest that 
the funding authority will always give a budget that is smaller than what the 
bureaucrat desires.  
Although we focus on government bureaucracy, our model can also apply to 
large private corporations.  The fiscal rule of a fixed budget that has to be returned if 
unspent is also common in the private sector where large firms are organized 
similarly.  Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, once described this with his 
often quoted statement: “The budget is the bane of corporate America.” (Fortune 
Magazine 1995)  Private firms tend to be more flexible with budget as they do not 
                                                 
8   “One can easily imagine similar task idiosyncrasies in public bureaucracies: regulators who 
understand the ways in which polluting, firms disguise their transmissions of toxins, police officers 
who have a sense of when community tensions are peaking, or social workers who are personally 
familiar with the work records of their clients”  (Gates and Brehm (1997) pp 16).  
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have to follow strict administrative rules of public bureaucracies.  Still it is common 
for private companies to operate with fixed budgets for their various departments and 
the rule that unspent budget are lost at the end of the fiscal year.  With various means 
and ways, the departments end up spending the unspent budget as the fiscal year 
moves toward its end. 
The fixed budget constraint can be seen as a form of “upper limited liability.”  
The limit on contingent transfers that the bureaucrat can offer in a contract is akin to 
Levin’s (2003) constraint of limited compensation imposed by self-enforcement.   
Levin studies self-enforced relational contracts and shows that self-enforcement 
restricts promised compensation.  The interaction between this upper limited liability 
and the traditional limited liability of the agent has dramatic effects on the incentive 
contract.  As in Levin  we also find that hidden information models may involve 
pooling when both sides (principal and agent) have limited resources. 
The professionalism of the bureaucrat, which reflects the congruence of 
preference between the bureaucrat and the authority, has also been noted in recent 
papers by Prendergast (2007), and Besley and Ghatak (2005).  They have pointed out 
that agents in public office or in private not-for-profit firms are often intrinsically 
motivated to deliver goods or services they are engaged to produce.  Although these 
papers are otherwise quite different, the degree of congruence of preference plays an 
important role just like the parameter k in our model. 
We present a model of bureaucracy with a funding authority, a bureaucrat, and 
an agent in section 2.  After characterizing the contract a bureaucrat will offer an 
agent in section 3, we study the funding authority’s problem in section 4 to show that 
there will be low powered incentives in a bureaucracy.  We conclude in section 5. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a three level hierarchy with hidden information: a funding authority (it), 
a bureaucrat (she) and an agent (he), where the agent has private information about 
production cost.  The funding authority could be the legislature, which is interested in 
the production of some output but does not have the time or the ability to manage the 
agent who runs the production process.  It delegates the task to the bureaucrat and  
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provides her with a fixed budget, denoted by B, independent of the output produced.  
The bureaucrat has expertise to contract with the agent and can offer an incentive 
contract to the agent.   
The agent is the productive unit in the hierarchy.  He produces an output, 
denoted by X  ≥ 0, at cost  
2
2 () c CX X = , where c > 0.  The constant c is private 
information of the agent and represents his type.  It can take two values cL with 
probability  qL and cH with probability qH (with cH > cL and qL + qH = 1).  The 
bureaucrat offers a contract to the agent specifying the output (XL or  XH) and a 
contingent transfer (tL or tH). 
The bureaucrat receives a fixed budget B from the funding authority and uses 
it to fund an incentive contract for the agent.  As argued in the introduction, the 
bureaucrat is a professional who shares the funding authority’s goals to a large extent, 
but also values any unspent budget, either as a discretionary budget to spend on 
bureaucratic perks or as “policy-drift”.  We capture this by the following objective 
function for the bureaucrat:
9 
(1)  qLXL + qHXH + k[B – qLtL – qHtH],  
where k is a congruence parameter, which puts a value for the bureaucrat on any 
unspent budget.  It will play a critical role in our model since the congruence 
parameter  k captures the difference in objectives between the bureaucrat and the 
funding authority.  If k = 1, they have identical relative valuations of output and 
unspent budget, and in the paper we focus on the case k ≤ 1.
 10  If k = 0, the bureaucrat 
only cares about the output – she is the “ultimate professional” like an 
environmentalist running the EPA or a school teacher running the department of 
education.  Unlike the funding authority, she does not care about the cost of raising 
the budget to run the bureaucracy.  So a lower k represents a more professional 
bureaucrat.   
                                                 
9 There are several ways to think about what the bureaucrat does with the unspent budget, and thus 
how she values it.  In this section, we ignore the interpretations and simply model the value of the 
unspent budget with an exogenous congruence parameter k.  We return to this issue in section 4, where 
we also consider the funding authority’s ability to vary k, for example by changing accounting controls 
or setting up legislative oversight committees. 
10 Depending on whether k is greater or less than one, the bureaucrat will want to over or underproduce 
relative to the second best.  Here we focus on the issue of over-production by assuming k ≤ 1.  
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The assumption that the funding authority gives the bureaucrat a fixed budget 
makes our modeling novel to the standard procurement problem of Laffont and Tirole 
(1993).  If the funding authority could vary the budget according to output, our model 
would boil down to a standard adverse selection model. 
We assume that the funding authority does not observe the details of the 
incentive contract.  As argued in the introduction, the funding authority is not able to 
measure with precision the output produced.  If it could, it would also know the 
amount of any unspent budget and easily prevent misdirected spending by the 
bureaucrat. 
The timing of the game is as follows: the funding authority presents the 
bureaucrat with a fixed budget B.  Next, the bureaucrat offers an incentive contract to 
the agent specifying the output (XL and XH) expected from each type of agent as well 
as the corresponding transfers (tL and tH).  We assume that the agent learns his type 
before signing this contract and therefore we have a model of adverse selection.  Next, 
production takes place and the appropriate contingent transfer is given to the agent.   
In her maximization problem, the bureaucrat faces the following incentive 
constraints, 
  ()





IC t X t X i j L H −≥ − =  
along with the participation constraints, 
  ()





IR t X i L H −≥ =  
and the budget constraints, 
  ( )         for  , ii BGt B i L H ≤= . 
(ICi) and (IRi) are standard constraints in a model of adverse selection, and (BGi) is 
the budget constraint limiting the transfers to the agent by the budget B available to 
the bureaucrat.  As benchmarks, we derive the first-best and the second-best cases.  In 
the first-best case, the principal directly contracts with an agent under full 











FB FB i c
tX = .  In the second best case,  
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again the principal directly contracts with an agent but under asymmetric information.  
This means the principal maximizes (1), where k = 0, such that (ICi) and (IRi), for i = 
L, H, are satisfied.  The second best (SB) contract is a menu:  
() () ()()
22 2 1 1




SB SB SB SB SB SB SB L H
LL L HH H q
L H q
cc c
Xt X X X tX
c cc
⎧ ⎫ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ Δ ⎪ ⎪ ⎢ ⎥ == + = = ⎨ ⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ +Δ ⎣⎦ ⎪ ⎪ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩ ⎭
with Δc=cH – cL . 
This is a standard second best contract with the efficient type producing at the 
first best level and obtaining a rent while the inefficient type has his output distorted 
and receives no rent.  Note also that 
SB SB
HL tt ≤ .  That means that a fixed budget 
covering the transfer to the low-cost agent would be partially unspent when the cost is 
high.  In the next section, we present the bureaucrat’s problem of deriving an optimal 
incentive scheme for the agent given B and k. 
 
 
3. The Bureaucrat’s Problem 
 
We begin our main analysis with the bureaucrat's problem taking as given the budget 
B from the funding authority.  The bureaucrat maximizes (1), such that (ICi), (IRi), 
and (BGi), for i = L, H, are satisfied. 
Note that this problem is different from the second best in two ways: the 
objective function (1) includes two new parameters, k and B, and there are two new 
budget constraints (BGi).  Only if neither budget constraints are binding and k = 1, 
will we get the second best contract to be optimal.  Thus, there are two sources of 
departures from the second best, those implied by a binding budget, and those implied 
by k < 1.  A binding budget may prevent the bureaucrat from having enough resources 
to implement the second best even if k = 1.  If k < 1, the bureaucrat’s marginal value 
of money is smaller than the funding authority’s, so she will value output relatively 
more than the funding authority.  The divergence of objectives between the funding 
authority and the bureaucrat regarding the relative value of money will lead to the 
budget being binding.  The analysis of this interaction between k and a binding budget 
is the focus of our paper.    
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This interaction leads to new considerations in characterizing optimal 
incentive schemes.  Since tL ≥ tH in equilibrium, increasing XL involves an additional 
cost implied by a tighter budget constraint over and above the standard production 
cost.  This makes XL less attractive to the bureaucrat than in the standard case.  As a 
result, the typically ignored (ICH) becomes relevant in our model since otherwise XL 
may fall below XH.  However, to make the exposition simpler, we replace (ICH) by the 
following monotonicity condition: 
(M)  XL ≥ XH.  
Indeed, we can verify ex post that (ICH) is satisfied by our optimal contract.
11   
As usual, we can ignore (IRL) since it is implied by (IRH) and (ICL), and given 
XL ≥ X H, the constraint (ICL) implies that tL ≥ t H.  Therefore, the budget constraint 
(BGH) will be satisfied if the constraint (BGL) holds.  Based on these arguments, we 
can present the bureaucrat's problem using only the relevant constraints.  The 
bureaucrat chooses the contract {XL, XH, tL, tH} to solve the problem given below, 




. .,   ( )    0,
2
()    ,
22
        ( )    ,
        ( )       .







Max q X q X k B q t q t
c
st IR t X
cc









First note that the (IRH) and (ICL) are binding since otherwise the bureaucrat 
could reduce the transfers and gain.  Substituting tL and tH using the binding (IRH) and 
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22
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Lq X q X k Bq X X q X
cc
BX X X X λμ
⎡Δ ⎤ ⎛⎞ =+ + − + − ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎡Δ ⎤ ⎛⎞ +− + + − ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 
where Δc=cH – cL, and λ ≥ 0, μ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers.  The two first-order 
conditions with respect to the outputs are: 
                                                 
11 It is easy to check that a binding (ICL) and (M) imply that (ICH) holds.  
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(2)  () 0 LL L L L
L
L




=− + + =
∂
, 
(3)  () 0 HH H L H
H
L




=− +Δ + Δ − =
∂
. 
There are several cases to analyze, which we do in turn.  It is easy to see that if 
the budget is not binding (λ = 0) but k > 0, the optimal contract would always be a 
separating contract, i.e., a contract where the outputs and transfers are distinct for 
each type.
12  The bureaucrat increases the output until the marginal value of output 
equals the marginal cost (including information rent) evaluated at rate k.  Because 
their marginal costs are different, the bureaucrat asks different outputs to different 
agents by offering a separating contract.  The optimal contract is very similar to the 
second-best contract identified above and would be identical if k = 1; for k < 1, the 
outputs would be larger than X
SB.
13 
When the budget is binding (λ > 0), there is a potential for the monotonicity 
condition (M) to become binding since increasing XL will entail an extra cost due to an 
increase in the transfer tL and tightening of the budget constraint.  If (M) is binding, μ 
> 0 and pooling occurs (XL = XH).  We obtain the condition for pooling by setting μ = 
0 in the first order conditions (2) and (3) and seeing when the monotonicity condition 
(M) is violated:  
() ( )
()
                   ,
               ,
( )         .
LH
HL L L LH H L
HL L L
XX
qk q c c qk q c k qc c




⇔+ ≥ + Δ + Δ
⇔− Δ ≥ Δ
 
As is well known, pooling is not optimal in a standard two-type model, which is also 
true in our model when the budget is not binding, i.e., λ = 0.  Thus, pooling can only 
occur if the budget is binding (λ > 0), which is obvious in condition (P).   
If condition (P) holds, we have XL = XH, and the binding (ICL) implies that tL 
= tH, with each type obtaining an identical contract.  The optimal output and transfer 
                                                 
12 Note that the budget must be binding if k = 0.  When k = 0, the bureaucrat cannot benefit from 
unspent budgets.  She only cares about the output and will want to spend the entire budget.   
Technically, if k = 0, the first order conditions (2) and (3) imply that λ > 0, meaning that the budget 
constraint is binding. 
13 Use λ = 0 in (5) to get X
SB.  
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in the pooling contract, denoted by (X
P,  t
P) can be derived by using (IRH) in the 






BX −≡ , and t
P = B.  
Interestingly, this contract appears to ignore incentives, i.e., it requires a 
constant output, X
P, irrespective of the actual cost of production.  This can be, 
however, the optimal incentive contract. Under a fixed budget, the bureaucrat may 
find it optimal to offer a flat incentive scheme to the agent.   
Since pooling can only occur if the budget is binding (λ > 0 in (P)), each type 
of agent receives the entire budget, and there is no unspent budget under pooling.  The 
parameter  k plays no role since there is no unspent budget in the hands of the 
bureaucrat, and X
P is independent of k.  Furthermore, we observe that X
P increases 
with B.  We can present some additional intuition about details of condition (P) once 
we have analyzed the separating contract, which we move to next. 
A key benefit to the bureaucrat from offering a separating contract is the 
unspent budget.  Unless she is interested in this unspent budget, the bureaucrat will 
not offer a separating contract.  Thus, for separation to be optimal, it is necessary to 
have a high enough k, which can be seen in condition (P) also.   
If condition (P) does not hold, the optimal contract is separating, which can be 




; ,  ; 
2
H
SS S S LH H H
LL H
LL L HH L
qq c X
Xt B X t
kq c c k q c q c c λλ
⎧⎫ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎪⎪ == = = ⎢ ⎥ ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ++ Δ + Δ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
,  
where λ is obtained from the binding budget constraint:  
(BG







Δ ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
The condition (P) also provides a necessary condition for pooling, which is 
can be presented as: 
(NP)  0 −Δ ≥ HL L qc q c . 
This necessary condition (NP) is best explained by considering the case where k = 0, 
where the bureaucrat is only interested in expected output.  If separation is optimal  
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when k = 0, then it will continue to be optimal for k > 0 since then the bureaucrat has 
the additional incentive to offer separation in order to appropriate the unspent budget.  
Looking at (2) and (3) when k = 0 immediately tells us that separation is optimal if 
and only if (NP) does not hold.  In this case, payments to the agent are not directly 
relevant to the bureaucrat, but only expected output and the budget constraint (BG) 
matter.  An increase in XL affects (BG) via cost cL and XH affects (BG) via rent Δc.  
Since the marginal benefits are qL and qH, we have XL greater than XH (when k = 0) if 
and only if qL/cL > qH/Δc. 
We gather in proposition 1 the results proven so far, and then analyze in detail 
the separating contract. 
 
Proposition 1: If the budget constraint is not binding, it is optimal for the bureaucrat 
to offer a separating contract (5).  If the budget constraint is binding, then offering a 
pooling contract (4) is optimal if condition (P) holds; otherwise, a separating 
contract (5) is optimal. 
 
The optimal separating contract has some familiar features to the second best 
contract.  The efficient agent (low cost) produces more than the inefficient agent (XL 
> XH) and obtains a rent.  The inefficient agent receives no rent.  However, there are 
some new features implied by the presence of k and a fixed Β.  With k > 0, since only 
the inefficient agent does not consume the entire budget, the bureaucrat is interested 
in limiting XH to increase the unspent budget.  When the budget is binding, B = tL, and 
since  ( ) ( )
22 22 LL L H tcX c X =+ Δ , there is an additional cost of increasing the outputs 
captured by the terms associated with the shadow price of the budget λ in (2) and (3).  
This additional cost will turn out to be key to understanding the implications on the 
power of incentives, defined as the ratio of outputs  LH XX , and to understand when 
pooling is likely to occur. 
We begin by examining the new features implied by changes in k, the value of 
the unspent budget to the bureaucrat.  It is intuitive that an increase in k makes the 
budget constraint less tight (λ falls) since the bureaucrat is now less interested in  
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output.
14  However, as can be seen from (5), the impact of k on the outputs is still hard 
to decipher.  The interaction is subtle and is based on the key insight that, given a 
fixed  B, the bureaucrat can increase the unspent budget only by reducing XH.  
Therefore, she lowers XH if her preference for the unspent budget k increases.  The 
reduction of XH implies that the rent to the L-type decreases, which allows her to 
increase XL and pursue her twin objective of obtaining high output.  Therefore, the 
power of incentives increases with k.  In other words, the bureaucrat offers a strong 
incentive scheme because she knows she will be able to benefit from the unspent 
budget.
15 
Also, from the binding budget constraint (BG
S) it is immediate that the two 
outputs are inversely related for a given budget.  Since the power of incentives 
increases with k, bureaucracies will tend to have lower powered incentives if 
bureaucrats are more professional.   
It may seem counterintuitive that the power of incentives increase with k as 
the parameter also represents the opportunity cost of unspent budget.  Note however, 
that the expected output, denoted by E[X
S] falls with k.  When the bureaucrat values 
the unspent budget more, the expected output falls.  Since the cost functions are 
convex, more dissimilar output levels (making XL/XH larger) would violate the fixed 
budget unless the expected output is reduced.  Then E[X
S] decreases with k since 
XL/XH increases with k.  Our model suggests a new argument why bureaucracies may 
find lower-powered incentives optimal: the lower value of money for the bureaucrat 
under the constraint of fixed budgets.   
Therefore, bureaucracies with more professional bureaucrats produce higher 
output.  However, professionals only care about output and don’t consider the cost of 
raising funds.  The funding authority controls professionals with fixed budgets. 
 
These results are summarized in proposition 2. 
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Proposition 2: In a separating equilibrium, i.e., when (P) does not hold, the more 
professional the bureaucrat (smaller k), the higher the output and the weaker the 
power of incentives.  In a pooling equilibrium, the outputs are independent of k. 
 
Proof: In the Appendix. 
 
Assuming that the necessary condition for pooling (NP) holds strictly, we 
illustrate the output levels with respect to k in Figure 1.  Consider first the extreme 
case where k = 0.  ,A pooling contract is optimal as the bureaucrat places no value on 
the unspent budget.  As k increases, the bureaucrat moves from offering a pooling to a 




S when k = kT.
16  For higher values of k, the bureaucrat decreases the expected 
output as she put more value on the unspent budget.
   To summarize, the bureaucrat 
continues with pooling until kT since the higher pooling output is more attractive than 
the relatively small budget-surplus, and only introduces separation when the value of 
the unspent budget outweighs the loss in expected output.  
 
                                                 
16 The cut-off kT is defined by  ( ) (, ) TH LL T L Bk q c q c kq c λ − Δ≡ Δ .  From this, given qHcL > qLΔc, kT >0 
if λ >0.  Indeed, as k goes to zero, we must have λ >0 by (5).  Otherwise XL  and XH would become 






k=0            kT(B)                              k = 1  
 
Figure 1. Changes in the optimal outputs as a function of k 













17  As 
B increases, the potential gain from the unspent budget (kqH (B–tH)) increases as well 
because tH increases but by less than the increase in B. Thus, the bureaucrat begins to 
offer a separating contract earlier (small k) for larger budgets.   
We now examine the new features implied by changes in the budget B.  Since 
an increase in B relaxes the budget constraint (BG) and lowers its shadow value, λ, it 















.  When offered a larger budget the bureaucrat can generate higher outputs 
by using larger transfers.  The more interesting issue is the power of incentives, i.e., 
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i.e., the power of incentives increases with a larger budget.  This is the result of a 
compromise between the two objectives of the bureaucrat: increasing output and 
retaining some unspent budget.  When k = 0, the ratio of XL to XH is constant across 
different levels of B.  However, if k > 0, the bureaucrat not only cares about the 
expected output but also the unspent budget.  To take both into account, the 
bureaucrat increases XL more than XH given an increase in B.  Therefore, our model 
suggests a new argument why bureaucracies may find lower-powered incentives 
optimal: under-funded agencies operating with a fixed budget.  An agency facing a 
small fixed budget will offer low powered incentives.  At the extreme, if B is small 
enough, all incentives are removed, the ratio XL/XH = 1, and we have a pooling 
contract. 
 
Proposition 3: Under-funded bureaucracies offer low powered incentives.   
 
Proof: In the Appendix. 
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Again assuming the necessary condition (NP) holds strictly, we show in figure 
2 how the outputs change with B.  For small budgets, the bureaucrat offers a pooling 
contract.  As the budget increases, the bureaucrat will eventually offer a separating 
contract to enjoy the unspent budget and the power of incentives will increase.   
 
 
BT is the critical budget level dividing the pooling and separating regions.
18  Since the 








19  With a higher k, the bureaucrat benefits more from the unspent 
budget.  Since only separating contracts generate unspent budget, the bureaucrat’s 
preference for separating contracts increases with k.   
Having established how the power of incentives is affected by the two key 
parameters, we can state when pooling is likely.  The power of incentives falls as B 
and k decrease and the outputs come closer to each other.  A smaller budget or a 
stronger preference for output, both imply a tighter budget constraint (λ increases), 
                                                 
18 The parameter BT is defined by  ( ) (, ) TH L L L Bkq c qc k qc λ − Δ≡ Δ .  Given qHcL > qLΔc, BT(k) > 0.  As 
B  goes to 0, (BG
S) implies that both outputs must go to zero, which is only true if λ becomes 
unbounded (see (5)).  But then, (P) must be satisfies as a strict inequality since all other variables are 
bounded.  
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               BT(k)                                          B 
Figure 2. Changes in the optimal outputs as a function of B 
assuming (NP) holds strictly.  
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which makes it more likely that the pooling condition (P) will be satisfied.  However, 
unless the necessary condition (NP) holds, pooling will not occur since the 
monotonicity condition (M) will not be violated.  The condition (NP) determines if the 
bureaucrat prefers a pooling contract when k = 0, i.e., when she is only interested 
output.  If not, then for higher k she will surely not violate (M) since her preference 
for the unspent budget increases with k, and only a separating contract will yield an 
unspent budget. 
For large values of k, the bureaucrat cares more about the unspent budget, 
which can be enjoyed only if she offers a separating contract.  In contrast, for small 
values of k, the bureaucrat cares more about output levels and offers a pooling 
contract whose output is greater than the output under a separating contract for a 
given budget.  Similarly, given a large B, the bureaucrat can afford to create a large 
unspent budget, which is only possible under separation.  For a small B, the 
bureaucrat focuses only on expected output by offering a pooling contract which does 
not leave any unspent budget.  These results are summarized in the next proposition.   
 
Proposition 4: Given that the necessary condition for pooling (NP) holds, pooling is 
more likely to occur for small budgets and if the bureaucrat is more professional 
(small k). 
Proof:  In the Appendix. 
We have studied the bureaucrat’s response to a given B and k.  In the next 
section, we discuss the funding authority’s problem when choosing the bureaucrat’s 
budget.   
 
 
4. The funding authority’s preference over k and B 
In section 3, we characterized the optimal contract a bureaucrat would offer an agent 
given a fixed budget.  We found that both increases in B and k result in higher 
powered incentives, but the two parameters differ in their impact on expected output.  
Expected output increases with B, but it decreases with k because a stronger 
preference for unspent budget means the bureaucrat finds output less attractive.  In 
this section, we will discuss the funding authority’s problem anticipating the optimal  
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contract offered by the bureaucrat for different values of B and k.  We will argue next 
that the funding authority will always choose the offer a budget that is binding for the 
bureaucrat and offer relatively smaller budget for less professional bureaucrats. . 
A key contribution in our modeling of a bureaucracy lies in how the 
bureaucrat values unspent budget  The higher the value of the unspent budget, 
whether due to a higher k or a larger B, the stronger the incentives.  Such incentives 
become close to the levels provided in the second best contract, i.e., when the 
principal does not need to rely on a bureaucracy to contract with the agent.  This is 
consistent with the popular notion about the burden of bureaucracies.  If the principal 
has a higher value of unspent budget than a bureaucrat, he is more careful in 
providing incentives to take advantage of opportunities, e.g., produce more when the 
cost is low.  Then, we expect that a bureaucrat less constrained by a fixed budget and 
who has more discretion over the unspent budget will behave more like a principal.   
There is a difference between the funding authority’s and the second best 
problem even if k = 1.  In this extreme case, the bureaucrat and the authority have 
identical relative values of money, and the bureaucrat would implement the second 
best outputs given a large enough budget.  The unspent budget, however, poses a 
problem.
20  Since it must give a fixed budget, the authority is not able to save money 
when the cost is high, which it would be able to do if it were able to contract directly 
with the agent.  Therefore, the authority would give a lower budget to the bureaucrat 
than the amount necessary to implement the second best outputs even if we had k = 1.  
For the bureaucrat, then, the budget constraint would be binding.  If k < 1, then the 
bureaucrat would overproduce relative to the second best (because her relative value 
of money is less than the authority’s) and the authority would again give her a smaller 
budget such that the constraint is binding.  Therefore, the budget constraint is always 
binding in the bureaucrat’s problem and the power of incentives is lower in a 
bureaucracy than in the second-best benchmark.  These results are summarized in the 
following proposition. 
 
                                                 
20 We assume that the authority does not benefit from however the unspent budget is used.  This does 
not necessarily mean the money is ‘stolen’.  It may be used to produce output that the bureaucrat 
values, e.g., research in a teaching college, but the Administration does not value.  
  20
Proposition 5.  The funding authority will offer a budget such that the budget 
constraint is binding for the bureaucrat, which implies that bureaucracies will have 
lower powered incentives than in the standard (second-best) case. 
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Note that a contract with strong incentives is not necessarily a good thing for 
the authority as long as budgets are fixed.  With a fixed budget, stronger incentives 
are associated with large unspent budgets, that are costly for the funding authority,.  
Furthermore, the authority knows that for higher values of k the bureaucrat offers a 
stronger incentive scheme so as to increase the amount of unspent budget but at the 
cost of lower expected output.  Therefore, the funding authority curtails the 
bureaucrat’s ability to engage in policy drift by lowering the budget when k increases.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Bureaucrats who operate under the budget rule “use it or lose it” are expected to 
return any unspent budget at the end of a fiscal year.  Instead, they tend to view 
unspent budgets as discretionary and go on spending sprees towards the end of the 
fiscal year even though much of the expenses are not in the interest of the funding 
authority.  This phenomenon is known as policy drift.  Sometimes, bureaucrats even 
“park” the unspent budget in “no year” accounts.  Staffers from the Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, and International Security estimated such amount to be 
$376 billion in 2006.
21 
In this paper, we showed how fixed budgets and policy drift imply that the 
optimal incentive contract of an agent employed in a bureaucracy will be low 
powered.  In our model, this occurs due to the non-congruence of preferences between 
the funding authority and the bureaucrat working under a fixed budget, which is 
different from typical explanations for low-powered incentives in bureaucracies.  We 
showed that bureaucrats who have small budgets or who have a lower policy drift 
tend to provide relatively low power inventive schemes.  In response to these distorted 
incentives, the funding authority will provide bigger budgets to bureaucrats with less 





policy drifts.  A possible testable implication of our model is that agencies with lower 





Proof of proposition 2 
 
Given that XL > XH (separating contracts) and therefore μ  = 0,  the Lagrangian 
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where  λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint.  The 
solution ( ,
SS
L H XX ) to this problem satisfies the following first-order conditions:  
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The derivatives of the first-order conditions with respect to k can be expressed 
as  
 









,   























L LL qcX α = ,  1
S
L L cX α = ,  2 L LL kq c c α λ = + ,  0 ()
S
H HL H qc q cX β =+ Δ , 
1
S
H cX β =Δ ,  2 HH L kq c kq c c β λ =+ Δ + Δ ,  1
S
L L cX γ = ,  2
S
H cX γ =Δ , and all of these 

















From (A1) and (A2),  ( )
()
S
LH H L L
S
HL L L H
qk q c k qc c X





















⎛⎞ ∂∂ ⎛⎞ =− > ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ + ⎝⎠
 
 






















































































. Denote the optimal outputs by X' for k = 
k′, with XL' > XH'.  Let k increase by a small amount to k".  An increase in k implies 
that XL increases to XL" and XH decreases to XH".  The bureaucrat’s objective function 
is E[X
S] + kqH(B – cHXH
2/2).  Thus the second term increases with k, and we claim that 
the first term E[X
S] must fall.  Suppose not.  Then the outputs Xi" yield a higher 
payoff than X' to the bureaucrat with k', which is a contradiction.  This is because the 
outputs Xi" are feasible under k' (because both X' and X" satisfy the budget constraint 
with the same budget), but not chosen.  Therefore both terms could have been 
increased by choosing Xi", which means that Xi' could not have been optimal. 
 
 
Proof of proposition 3 
 

































where all coefficients α, β, and γ are positive and defined in the proof of proposition 1. 
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from (A11) or (A12). Finally, from the expression  ( )
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 from (A14). 
 
 
Proof of proposition 4 
 
The condition for pooling is  
 
(P)  ( ) HL L L qc q c k q c λ − Δ≥ Δ . 
 





 from (A7). 





 from (A14).  
 
 
Proof of proposition 5 
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Using the binding (IRH) and (ICL), the outputs can be expressed as XH = XH(tH) and XL 
= XL(tL, tH). Then the bureaucrat’s problem becomes  
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Denoting the solutions to the above conditions as 
*
L t  and 
*
H t , let us now define 
*
L B t ≡ .   
Suppose the funding authority decreases the budget from B  by 
|| 0 dB ε + =→ . The expected output, 
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.  From the definition of B , we know that the 
budget constraint will become binding if the budget decreases from B  since  the 
bureaucrat will have to modify her unconstrained contract to satisfy the smaller 








From the binding (ICL), which should hold as an identity at equilibrium with respect 
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From this, the absolute value of the decrease in the expected output when the 
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That is, when the budget decreases by ε  from B , the expected output decreases but 
less then ε . Given that the funding authority’s payoff is  LL HH qX qX B + −  (assuming 
that the bureaucrat does not return unspent budgets), it implies that the funding 
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